ACADEMIC WRITING SAMPLE ANSWERS

Academic Writing Sample Answers Practice 6 Test 01

This original practice page includes Task 1 (Dynamic Mixed Chart) and Task 2 (Discuss Both Views and Give Your Opinion), with Band 9, Band 8, and Band 7 sample answers for IELTS preparation.
Academic Writing Task 1

Task 1 · Dynamic Mixed Chart

Task 1 Prompt

You should spend about 20 minutes on this task. Write at least 150 words.

The chart below shows the changes in population age structure (proportion of population aged 0-14, 15-64, and 65+) and the corresponding urban housing demand index in a country from 1990 to 2030 (with projections after 2020).

Summarise the information by selecting and reporting the main features, and make comparisons where relevant.

Academic Writing Task 1 Dynamic Mixed Chart practice image
BAND 9

Part 1 · Band 9 Sample Answer

The chart traces changes in the age composition of a country’s population between 1990 and 2030 and compares them with movements in an urban housing demand index, for which 1990 equals 100. Figures beyond 2020 are projected.

Overall, the population becomes progressively older across the period, as the share of children contracts while that of people aged 65 and over expands substantially. Although the working-age group remains by far the largest throughout, its proportion is expected to decline after an earlier period of relative stability. Meanwhile, urban housing demand rises continuously and is forecast to reach almost three times its 1990 level by 2030.

In 1990, those aged 15–64 accounted for approximately 63% of the population, compared with 30% for children and only 7% for senior citizens. By 2000, the working-age share had edged up to about 66%, whereas the proportion aged 0–14 had fallen five percentage points to 25%. The elderly group grew modestly to around 9%. In 2010, the corresponding figures were approximately 65%, 23% and 12%.

Ageing becomes more pronounced thereafter. By 2020, children and over-65s each represented roughly 18% of the population, leaving about 64% in the central age band. The 2030 projection puts these shares at 16%, 24% and 60% respectively. Alongside these demographic shifts, the housing index climbed from 100 in 1990 to around 160 in 2000 and 210 in 2010. It reached approximately 245 in 2020 and is predicted to increase further to about 280 by 2030.

BAND 8

Part 1 · Band 8 Sample Answer

The chart presents the proportions of a country’s population in three age groups from 1990 to 2030, together with an index of demand for urban housing. The figures after 2020 are forecasts, and the housing index uses 1990 as its base year of 100.

Overall, the country experienced a clear shift towards an older population. The percentage of people under 15 decreased steadily, while the share aged 65 or above rose throughout and is expected to become considerably larger than the youngest group by 2030. The 15–64 category continued to form the majority, although its proportion is forecast to fall. At the same time, demand for urban housing increased strongly.

In 1990, children made up 30% of the population and people aged 65 and over accounted for about 7%. The remaining 63% were of working age. Ten years later, the child share had dropped to 25%, while the middle group reached its highest level, at roughly 66%, and the oldest group rose to around 9%. By 2010, these proportions stood at about 23%, 65% and 12% respectively.

In 2020, the two dependent-age groups were equal at approximately 18% each, with 15–64-year-olds representing the other 64%. By 2030, the figures are projected to be 16% for children, 60% for working-age adults and 24% for older people. The housing demand index followed a consistent upward path, rising from 100 to about 160 in 2000, 210 in 2010 and 245 in 2020, before a predicted increase to around 280.

BAND 7

Part 1 · Band 7 Sample Answer

The chart shows how the percentages of people in three age groups changed in a country between 1990 and 2030. It also gives an urban housing demand index, with the 1990 figure set at 100. Data after 2020 are projected.

Overall, the proportion of children fell, whereas the percentage of elderly people increased. People aged 15–64 remained the largest group during the whole period, but their share is expected to become smaller by 2030. Urban housing demand rose at every point shown and is forecast to continue increasing.

In 1990, 30% of the population was aged 0–14, while about 63% was in the 15–64 group. People aged 65 and above accounted for the smallest share, at roughly 7%. In 2000, the percentage of children had fallen to 25%. By contrast, the working-age group increased slightly to around 66%, and the oldest group grew to about 9%. In 2010, the three figures were approximately 23%, 65% and 12% respectively.

By 2020, both the youngest and oldest groups represented about 18% of the population, while the share of 15–64-year-olds was roughly 64%. The 2030 figures are expected to be 16%, 60% and 24% respectively. Housing demand also increased considerably: the index rose from 100 in 1990 to around 160 in 2000 and 210 in 2010. It then reached about 245 in 2020 and is predicted to climb to approximately 280 by 2030.

Academic Writing Task 2

Task 2 · Discuss Both Views and Give Your Opinion

Task 2 Prompt

You should spend about 40 minutes on this task. Write at least 250 words.

Write about the following topic:

Some people believe that rapid technological advancement, particularly in automation and artificial intelligence, will lead to a future where most people have more leisure time and can pursue creative or personal interests. Others argue that it will instead result in greater economic inequality and job insecurity for the majority.

Discuss both these views and give your own opinion.

Give reasons for your answer and include any relevant examples from your own knowledge or experience.

BAND 9

Part 2 · Band 9 Sample Answer

Advances in automation and artificial intelligence have revived an old hope: machines may perform much of the work needed for a comfortable life. While this could release people from routine labour and create time for personal interests, it could also concentrate income and power among those who own the technology. In my view, greater leisure is technically achievable, but without deliberate changes to how productivity gains are distributed, widening inequality and insecure employment are the more likely outcomes for most workers.

The optimistic case rests on rising productivity. If software can process invoices, diagnose equipment faults or organise deliveries in a fraction of the time required, society can produce the same goods and services with fewer working hours. Automation can also remove dangerous and monotonous tasks, allowing people to concentrate on work involving judgement, empathy or imagination. Provided that wages are maintained while the working week is shortened, individuals would gain time to care for relatives, study, start creative projects or rest. Previous productivity improvements have made paid holidays and shorter working days possible in many countries, so a further reduction is not inherently unrealistic.

However, technological capacity does not determine how its rewards are shared. A firm that automates half its operations may dismiss employees rather than reduce everyone’s hours, leaving the remaining staff working as intensively as before. The profits may then flow mainly to shareholders and a small group of highly skilled specialists. Furthermore, workers whose roles disappear cannot always move smoothly into new occupations: a warehouse employee may lack the time, money or aptitude to retrain as an AI engineer. Even people who retain employment may face short contracts, algorithmic monitoring and weaker bargaining power because employers can threaten to replace them.

For these reasons, I believe the pessimistic prediction will prevail unless public policy and workplace institutions shape the transition. Education and retraining are necessary, but they are insufficient on their own. Governments should also provide portable benefits and strong income support, while tax systems should capture a reasonable share of exceptional technology-driven profits. Employees need a voice in deciding whether efficiency gains become redundancies, higher pay or shorter hours. Trials of reduced working weeks could help translate productivity into genuine leisure rather than unemployment.

In conclusion, automation and AI can create a society with more freedom from work, but they will not do so automatically. Unless ownership and productivity gains are distributed more broadly, technological progress is more likely to deepen insecurity and inequality than to give the majority a richer personal life.

BAND 8

Part 2 · Band 8 Sample Answer

Rapid progress in automation and artificial intelligence is changing both the amount and the nature of human work. Some people expect machines to take over routine duties and give everyone more free time, whereas others fear that the main results will be insecure jobs and a wider gap between rich and poor. I believe both outcomes are possible, but the benefits will reach the majority only if governments and employers actively share the gains from higher productivity.

There are good reasons to believe that technology could reduce working time. Automated systems can complete repetitive factory, administrative and analytical tasks much faster than people. If businesses can produce the same output with fewer labour hours, employees could work four days instead of five without reducing living standards. They would then have more opportunities to pursue hobbies, develop new skills or spend time with their families. Technology may also create new forms of flexible work. For example, a designer using AI tools might finish basic editing quickly and devote more time to original ideas and personal projects.

On the other hand, companies are not required to use efficiency gains to shorten the working week. They may instead remove positions and retain the savings as profit. This would particularly affect people in routine clerical, retail, transport and production roles, while those who own advanced systems or possess scarce technical skills could receive much higher incomes. Retraining is often presented as the solution, but it may not help everyone. Middle-aged workers with financial responsibilities cannot necessarily spend several years preparing for an entirely different profession. Moreover, even new jobs may be insecure if platforms rely on temporary contractors rather than permanent employees.

In my opinion, a future with greater leisure is desirable and realistic, but it is not the result that current technology will automatically produce. Governments should fund practical retraining, protect workers during periods of transition and ensure that flexible workers receive basic employment benefits. Employers should also be encouraged to reduce hours before making large-scale redundancies when automation raises productivity. Taxation of unusually large gains could support these measures without discouraging ordinary innovation.

To conclude, AI and automation have the potential to free people from repetitive labour, yet they can equally intensify inequality and insecurity. Whether most citizens gain leisure or lose stability will depend less on the machines themselves than on the economic rules governing their use.

BAND 7

Part 2 · Band 7 Sample Answer

Automation and artificial intelligence are developing quickly and are likely to change many workplaces. Some people think these technologies will complete much of today’s work, allowing the public to enjoy more leisure. Others believe they will mainly cause unemployment, insecure work and greater inequality. In my opinion, technology can eventually reduce working hours, but job insecurity is the more probable result unless governments introduce effective protections.

Supporters of automation argue that machines can perform repetitive tasks efficiently. Robots can handle routine factory processes, while AI programs can organise information, prepare simple documents and answer common customer questions. As a result, companies may be able to maintain production with fewer hours of human labour. If these savings are passed on to employees, people could have shorter working weeks while continuing to earn a reasonable income. Extra free time could be used for exercise, family life, education or creative interests. Workers may also find their jobs more satisfying if machines perform the most boring or dangerous duties.

However, businesses may choose to reduce their workforce instead of everyone’s working hours. This can make employment less secure, especially for people whose jobs involve predictable tasks. Although new technical occupations will be created, a person who loses a driving or office job may not have the qualifications needed for them. There is also a risk that the financial rewards will go mainly to technology companies, investors and highly trained professionals. Meanwhile, many other people may have to accept temporary or poorly paid work, increasing the difference between the highest and lowest earners.

I therefore believe that society should not assume technological progress will naturally produce more leisure. Governments need to offer affordable retraining and financial assistance to displaced workers. Employment laws should also give contract and platform workers basic protections. Where automation greatly improves output, employers could reduce weekly hours gradually instead of immediately dismissing staff. These policies would allow more people to benefit from increased productivity.

In conclusion, advanced technology offers a real opportunity to reduce unpleasant work and provide more personal time. Nevertheless, without fair policies and responsible decisions by employers, it is more likely to increase inequality and make work less secure for the majority.

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